

Foreign Policy

Theories, Actors, Cases

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The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis

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Reader's guide

This chapter traces the evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as a subfield of International Relations (IR) from its beginnings in the 1950s through its classical period until 1993; it then sketches the research agenda of contemporary FPA, which is represented by the other chapters in this volume. Three paradigmatic works, by Richard Snyder and colleagues, James Rosenau, and Harold and Margaret Sprout, laid the foundation of this subfield. In turn, these works created three main threads of research in FPA, focusing on the decision making of small/large groups, comparative foreign policy, and psychological/sociological explanations of foreign policy. These three primary areas of research have waxed and waned in importance to the subfield over the years. Current FPA scholarship explores linkages between these literatures, seeking both greater cross-level integration of explanation and new methodologies more appropriate to cross-level analysis.¹

Introduction: three paradigmatic works

What are the origins of **foreign policy analysis** (FPA)? In one sense, FPA-style work—that is, scholarship whose theoretical ground is human decision makers, acting singly or within groups—has been around as long as there have been historians and others who have sought to understand why national governments have made the choices they did regarding interstate relations. (See Box 1.1). But FPA-style work within the field of International Relations *per se* is best dated back to the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Three paradigmatic works arguably built the foundation of FPA.

- *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954; see also Snyder et al. 1963; reprinted in 2002).

BOX 1.1 Key definitions

FOREIGN POLICY The strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing.

FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR The observable artefacts of foreign policy—specific actions and words used to influence others in the realm of foreign policy; may include the categorization of such behaviour, such as along conflict-cooperation continua, which categorizations could be used to construct data including event data. FPB may include behaviour that was accidental or unintended by the government, and in addition decisions to do nothing may not leave any behavioural artefact. Thus there is slippage between the concept of foreign policy and the concept of foreign policy behaviour.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS The subfield of international relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behaviour, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly and in groups. The subfield has several hallmarks:

- a commitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information;
- a commitment to build actor-specific theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world;
- a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;
- a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science;
- a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision making as important as the output thereof.

ACTOR-GENERAL THEORY Theory that explains the behaviour of actors in general, such as game theory.

ACTOR-SPECIFIC THEORY Theory that explains the behaviour of specific actors, such as FPA theory. This type of theory may be generalizable, but under specific scope conditions for applicability. Actor-specific theory is a form of middle-range theory, in that it is more generalizable than insights derived from case studies but, on the other hand, has more severe scope conditions constraining its generalizability than actor-general theory. However, given its nature, actor-specific theory allows for richer explanation and even prediction of the foreign policy behaviour of particular entities than does actor-general theory.

- 'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy' by James N. Rosenau (a book chapter written in 1964 and published in Farrell 1966).
- *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956: expanded and revised in article form in 1957) and their 1965 book *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics*. (See Box 1.2.)

The work of Richard Snyder and his colleagues inspired researchers to look below the nation-state level of analysis to the players involved:

We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision makers. Hitherto, precise ways of relating domestic factors have not been adequately developed. (Snyder *et al.* 1954: 53)

BOX 1.2 Three paradigmatic works of foreign policy analysis**Richard Snyder**

Decision making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954; see also Snyder *et al.* 1963; reprinted in 2002).

Contributed a focus on the decision-making process itself as part of the explanation, rather than just foreign policy outputs

James Rosenau


'Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy' by James N. Rosenau (a book chapter written in 1964 and published in Farrell 1966).

Development of actor-specific theory that would lead to the development of generalizable propositions at the level of middle-range theory

Harold and Margaret Sprout

Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956; expanded and revised in article form in 1957 and their 1965 book *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics*).

Foreign policy can only be explained with reference to the psycho-milieu (the psychological, situational, political, and social contexts) of the individuals involved in decision making



Richard Snyder leading a foreign policy seminar.


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In taking this approach, Snyder and his colleagues bequeathed to FPA its characteristic emphasis on **foreign policy decision making** (FPDM) as versus foreign policy *outcomes*. Decision making was best viewed as 'organizational behaviour', by which the basic determinants would be spheres of competence of the actors involved, communication and information flow; and motivations of the various players. Desirable explanations would thus be both multicausal and interdisciplinary.

As explored in the Foreword, James Rosenau's pre-theorizing encouraged scholars to systematically and scientifically tease out cross-nationally applicable generalizations about nation-state behaviour. As Rosenau put it,

To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. . . . Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations. . . . Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory. (Rosenau 1966: 98-9)

General testable theory was needed, and the intent of Rosenau's article was to point in the direction it lay. However, the general theory Rosenau advocates is not the grand theory of Cold War IR: the metaphor Rosenau used in this work is instructive in this regard—FPA researchers should emulate Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, who was able to discern genotype from phenotype in plants through careful observation and comparison. Are there genotypes of nation-states, knowledge of which would confer explanatory and predictive power on our models of foreign policy interaction? What Rosenau was encouraging was the development of **middle-range theory**—theory that mediated between grand principles and the complexity of reality. At the time Rosenau wrote this article, he felt that the best way to uncover such mid-range generalizations was through aggregate statistical exploration and confirmation. Rosenau also underscored the need to integrate information at several levels of analysis—from individual leaders to the international system—in understanding foreign policy. As with Snyder, the best explanations would be multilevel and multicausal, integrating information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.



James Rosenau, pioneer of foreign policy analysis.

Harold and Margaret Sprout contributed to the formation of the field by suggesting that understanding foreign policy outputs, which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system, without reference to foreign policy undertakings, which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions, was misguided: 'Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an undertaking, there can be no achievement—and nothing to explain or estimate' (1965: 225). To explain undertakings, one needs to look at the *psycho-milieu* of the individuals and groups making the foreign policy decision. The *psycho-milieu* is the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by these decision makers. Incongruities between the perceived and the real operational environments can occur, leading to less than satisfactory choices in foreign policy. The sources of these incongruities were diverse, requiring once again multicausal explanations drawing from a variety of fields. Even in these early years, the Sprouts saw a clear difference between foreign policy analysis and what we have called actor-general theory:

Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's *probable* motivations and purposes, his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of *assumptions* as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist—be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist—undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies. (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 118)

The message of these three works was powerful in its appeal to certain scholars: the particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy were vitally important to understanding foreign policy choice. Such particularities should not remain as undigested idiosyncracies (as in traditional single-country studies), but rather be incorporated as instances of larger categories of variation in the process of cross-national middle-range theory-building. Multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the most macro, should ideally be integrated in the service of such theory. The stores of knowledge of all the social sciences must be drawn upon in this endeavour. The process of foreign policy making was at least as important, if not more important, than foreign policy as an output. The substance of this message was and continues to be the 'hard core' of FPA. (See Box 1.3.)

The second wave of theorizing built upon the foundational paradigmatic works. Between 1974 and 1993 FPA developed a number of parallel research pathways. (See Box 1.4.)

Other parts of the message were more temporally bounded. As we shall see, certain methodological stances that perhaps seemed self-evident in the early 1960s would not stand the test of time. These would engender troubling paradoxes, which would plague the field and lead to a temporary decline in some areas in the mid to late 1980s until they were satisfactorily resolved. Despite these paradoxes, the first bloom of FPA, lasting from the late 1960s to the aforementioned decline, was a time of great intellectual effort and excitement.

Classic FPA scholarship (1954–1993)

The energy and enthusiasm of the first generation of work in FPA (1954–1973) was tremendous. Great strides in conceptualization, along with parallel efforts in data collection and methodological experimentation, were the contributions of this time period. The second



Harold and Margaret Sprout who emphasized the psychological milieu of individual and group decision making.

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BOX 1.3 Primary levels of analysis in FPA

Cognitive processes Cognition, learning, heuristic fallacies, emotion, etc.

Leader personality and orientation Operational codes, motivations, psychobiography, etc.

Small-group dynamics Groupthink, newgroup, coalitions, etc.

Interface of leader personality with small-group composition

Organization process Incremental learning, standard operating procedures, implementation issues, etc.

Bureaucratic politics Turf, morale, budget, influence, inter-agency group politics, etc.

Culture and foreign policy Identity and nationalism, heroic histories, role theory, etc.

Domestic political contestation Regime type, media, political interest groups, organized party contestation and electoral politics, etc.

National attributes and foreign policy Geography, resources, economic factors, etc.

System effects on foreign policy Anarchy, distribution of power, regional balances of power, etc.

generation of work from about 1974 to 1993 expressly built upon those foundations. Though it is always difficult to set the boundaries of a field of thought, the overview which follows includes a representative sampling of classic works in the first and second generation which both examined how the 'specifics' of nations lead to differences in foreign policy choice/behaviour, and put forward propositions in this regard that at least have the potential to be generalizable and applicable cross-nationally.

BOX 1.4 Classical foreign policy analysis—the second generation**Small-group decision making**

Refers to the process and structure of groups making foreign policy decisions. The groups that were studied ranged in size from very small groups to large organizations and bureaucracies. Insights from social psychology were incorporated into FPA. It was discovered that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group could result in a deterioration of decision-making quality.

Organizational process and bureaucratic politics

Researchers began to study the influence of organization process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision making. Organizations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities; often they will seek to increase their relative strength. It was found that the ulterior objectives of foreign policy decision 'players' influenced their decision making.

Comparative foreign policy

The subfield of comparative foreign policy (CFP) developed as a response to James Rosenau's challenge to build a cross-national and multilevel theory of foreign policy. Foreign policy *behaviour*, as disparate as warfare, treaty making, or diplomacy—these events could be compared and aggregated. Data was collected on a variety of possible explanatory factors to determine patterns by which these independent variables were correlated. Researchers hoped to emerge with a grand unified theory of foreign policy behaviour applicable to all nations and time periods. The empirical results were less than the protagonists had hoped.

Psychological influences on foreign policy decision making

Increasing attention was directed to the *mind* of the foreign policy decision maker. Under certain stressful conditions, individual characteristics would become crucial in understanding how decisions are made. Also, the problem of misperception was identified, with potential disastrous consequences in relation to questions of war and peace.

Societal milieu

The societal context also came to the fore. Researchers examined how far national attributes, such as culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, military power, ideology, and demographics, determined policy making. The nature of regime type also rose in prominence, particularly with the realization that democracies tended not to fight with one another.

Group decision making

Snyder and colleagues had emphasized the process and structure of groups making foreign policy decisions (Snyder extended his work with case studies in collaboration with Glenn Paige; see Snyder and Paige 1958; Paige 1959; Paige 1968). Numerous scholars echoed this theme in their work, which ranged from the study of foreign policy making in very small groups to the study of foreign policy making in very large organizations and bureaucracies.

Small group dynamics

Some of the most theoretically long-lived work produced during this period centred on the consequences of making foreign policy decisions in small groups. Social psychologists had explored the unique dynamics of such a decision setting before, but never in relation to foreign policy decision making, where the stakes might be much higher. The most important work is that of Irving Janis, whose seminal *Victims of Groupthink* almost single-handedly began this research tradition. In that volume, and using studies drawn specifically from the realm of foreign policy, Janis shows convincingly that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision-making quality. The empirical research of Leana (1975), Semmel (1982), Semmel and Minix (1979), Tetlock (1979), and others extended this research using aggregate analysis of experimental data as well as case studies. **Groupthink** becomes one of several possible outcomes in the work of C.F. Hermann (1978). Hermann categorizes groups along several dimensions (size, role of leader, rules for decision, autonomy of group participants), and is able to make general predictions about the likely outcome of deliberations in each type of group.

The work of the second wave moved 'beyond groupthink' to both refine and extend our understanding of small-group processes. Representative work includes Herek *et al.* (1987, 1989), McCauley (1989), Ripley (1989), Stewart *et al.* (1989), Hart (1990), Gaenslen (1992), and Hart *et al.* (1997).

The second wave also brought with it a new research issue. How does a group come to understand, represent, and frame a given foreign policy situation? Works include those by George Breslauer, Charles F. Hermann, Donald Sylvan, Philip Tetlock, and James Voss (Vertzberger 1990; Breslauer and Tetlock 1991; Voss *et al.* 1991; Billings and Hermann 1994). Turning to efforts by individual scholars, we will highlight the work of Khong (1992) and Boynton (1991).

Boynton wishes to understand how human agents in groups come to agreement on the nature of a foreign policy situation. In his 1991 paper (cited above), he uses the official record of Congressional Committee hearings to investigate how committee members make sense of current events and policies. By viewing the questions and responses in the hearing as an unfolding narrative, Boynton is able to chart how 'meaning' crystallizes for each committee member, and how they attempt to share that meaning with other members and with those who are testifying. Boynton posits the concept of 'interpretive triple' as a way to understand how connections between facts are made through plausible interpretation—in effect, ascertaining which interpretations are plausible within the social context created by the hearings.

Khong's 1992 book, *Analogies at War*, has a similar aim but with a different focus: the use of analogies to guide **problem framing** by foreign policy makers. In this particular work, Khong demonstrates how the use of conflicting analogies to frame the problem of Vietnam led to conceptual difficulties in group reasoning about policy options. The 'Korea' analogy gained ascendance in framing the Vietnam problem, without sufficient attention being paid to the incongruities between the two sets of circumstances.

Organizational process and bureaucratic politics

This first period also saw the emergence of a strong research agenda that examined the influence of organizational process and bureaucratic politics on foreign policy decision making. The foundations of this approach can be traced back to Weber's *The Theory of Social and*

Economic Organizations (from the 1920s). First-period research showed how 'rational' foreign policy making can be upended by the attempt to work with and through large organized governmental groups. Organizations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, and this survival is measured by relative influence vis à vis other organizations ('turf'), by the organization's budget, and by the morale of its personnel. The organization will jealously guard and seek to increase its turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its 'essence' or 'mission'. Large organizations also develop **standard operating procedures** (SOPs) which, while allowing them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or creativity. These SOPs may be the undoing of more innovative solutions of decision makers operating at levels higher than the organization, but there is little alternative to the implementation of policy by bureaucracy. The interface between objectives and implementation is directly met at this point, and there may be substantial slippage between the two because of the incompatibility of the players' perspectives.

Although the articulation of this research agenda can be found in works such as Huntington (1960), Schilling *et al.* (1962), Hilsman (1967), and Neustadt (1970), probably the most cited works are Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974) (additional works co-authored by Halperin include Allison and Halperin (1972) and Halperin and Kanter (1973)). In his famous *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison offers three cuts at explaining one episode in foreign policy—the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Investigating both the US and the Soviet sides of this case, Allison shows that the unitary rational-actor model of foreign policy making does not suffice to explain the curiosities of the crisis. Offering two additional models as successive 'cuts' at explanation, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (one of intra-organizational factors, and one of inter-organizational factors), allows Allison to explain more fully what transpired. His use of three levels of analysis also points to the desire to integrate rather than segregate explanations at different levels.

Halperin's book *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974) is an extremely detailed amalgam of generalizations about bureaucratic behaviour, accompanied by unforgettable examples from American defence policy making of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. It should be noted that bureaucratic politics research gained impetus from the Vietnam War ongoing during this period, because the war was seen by the public as defence policy run amok due, in part, to bureaucratic imperatives (e.g. Krasner 1971).

Comparative foreign policy

Those who took up James Rosenau's challenge to build a cross-national and multilevel theory of foreign policy and subject that theory to rigorous aggregate empirical testing created the subfield known as **comparative foreign policy** (CFP). It is in CFP that we see most directly the legacy of scientism/behaviouralism in FPA's genealogy. Foreign policy could not be studied in aggregate—foreign policy *behaviour* could. Searching for an analogue to the 'vote' as the fundamental explanandum in behaviouralist American political studies, CFPers proposed the foreign policy **event**—the tangible artefact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy, alternatively viewed as 'who does what to whom, how' in international affairs. Events could be compared along behavioural dimensions, such as whether positive or negative effect was

being displayed, or what instruments of statecraft (diplomatic, military, economics, etc.) were used in the influence attempt, or what level of commitment of resources was evident. Behaviour as disparate as a war, a treaty, or a state visit could now be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion.

This conceptualization of the dependent variable was essential to the theory-building enterprise in CFP. To uncover law-like generalizations, one would have to conduct empirical testing across nations and across time; case studies were not an efficient methodology from this standpoint. However, with the conceptual breakthrough of the 'event', it was now possible to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determine (by analysing the variance in the event's behavioural dimensions) the patterns by which these independent variables were correlated with foreign policy behaviour (see McGowan and Shapiro 1973). Indeed, to talk to some scholars involved in CFP research, it seemed that their goal was nothing less than a GUT (grand unified theory) of all foreign policy behaviour for all nations for all time. Some set of master equations would link all the relevant variables, independent and dependent, together, and when applied to massive databases providing values for these variables, would yield R-squares approaching 1.0. Although the goal was perhaps naive in its ambition, the sheer size of the task called forth immense efforts in theory building, data collection, and methodological innovation that have few parallels in IR.

Events data

The collection of **events data** was funded to a significant degree by the US government. Andriole and Hopple (1981) estimate that the government (primarily Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation) provided over \$5 million for the development of events datasets during the time period 1967–1981. Generally speaking, the collection effort went like this: students were employed to comb through newspapers, chronologies, and other sources for foreign policy events, which they would then code according to rules listed in their coding manuals, have their coding periodically checked for intercoder reliability, and finally punch their codings up on computer cards. For example, if we wanted to code an event such as 'The USA invaded Afghanistan', we would code a date (DDMMYYYY), the actor (USA), the subject (Afghanistan), and some code or series of codes that would indicate 'invasion'. A series of codes might work like this: the code for invasion might be '317', the '3' indicating that this was a hostile act, the '1' indicating it was a military act, and the '7' indicating in more specific fashion invasion. Many other variables could also be coded; for example, we might code that the United Nations facilitated the act by sponsoring a Security Council Resolution, we might link in previous events such as Mullah Omar's refusal to turn in Osama bin Laden, and so forth. Events data sets, then, contain thousands or even millions of lines of code, each of which is a foreign policy 'event'.

The acronyms of some of these events data projects live on: some because the data are still being collected (e.g. Gerner *et al.* 1994) (some collection is funded by the DDIR (Data Development for International Research) Project of the NSF), and others because the data are still useful as a testing ground for hypotheses—WEIS (the World Event/Interaction Survey), COPDAB (the Conflict and Peace Data Bank), CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations), and so forth. The Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) is more of a second-wave effort,

in that the Kansas team has developed machine coding of events, leading to much more reliable and capacious data collection and coding than was possible in the first wave of events data (Schrodt 1995).

Integrated explanations

In contrast to the other two types of FPA scholarship being discussed, CFP research aimed explicitly at *integrated multilevel* explanations. The four most ambitious of these projects were those of Brecher (1972) and his associates in the IBA Project (Wilkenfeld *et al.* 1980), DON (Rummel 1972, 1977), CREON (East *et al.* 1978; Callahan *et al.* 1982), and Harold Guetzkow's INS (Guetzkow 1963). Independent variables at several levels of analysis were linked by theoretical propositions (sometimes instantiated in statistical or mathematical equations) to properties or types of foreign policy behaviour. At least three of the four attempted to confirm or disconfirm the propositions by aggregate empirical testing. Unfortunately, the fact that the empirical results were not all that had been hoped for ushered in a period of disenchantment with all things CFP, as we shall see in a later section.

The psychological and societal milieux of foreign policy decision making

The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a *tabula rasa*: it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions. Each decision maker's mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision maker operates. The Sprouts (1956, 1957, 1965) referred to these as the milieu of decision making, and scholarly efforts to explore that milieu were both innovative and impressive during this first period. Michael Brecher's work cited above (Brecher 1972) belongs in this genotype as well. Brecher's *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* explores that nation's psycho-cultural environment and its effects on Israel's foreign policy. Unlike Brecher's integrative approach to the psycho-social milieu, most works in this genotype examined either the psychological aspects of FPDM, or its broader societal aspects.

Individual characteristics

Would there be a distinct field of foreign policy analysis without this most micro of all explanatory levels? Arguably not. It is in the cognition and information processing of an actual human agent that all the explanatory levels of FPA are in reality integrated. What sets FPA apart from more mainstream IR is this insistence that, as Hermann and Kegley put it, '[a] compelling explanation (of foreign policy) cannot treat the decider exogenously' (1994: 4).

Political psychology can assist us in understanding the decider. Under certain conditions—high stress, high uncertainty, dominant position of the head of state in FPDM—the personal characteristics of the individual will become crucial in understanding foreign policy choice.

The work of Harold Lasswell on political leadership was a significant influence on many early pioneers of political psychology with reference to foreign policy (see Lasswell, 1930, 1948). Joseph de Rivera's *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (1968) is an excellent survey and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to foreign policy cases. Another early effort at a systematic study of leader personality effects is the concept of **operational code**, an idea originating with Leites (1951), and refined and extended by one of the most important figures in this area of research—Alexander George (1969). Defining an operational code involves identifying the core political beliefs of the leader about the inevitability of conflict in the world, the leader's estimation of his or her own power to change events, and so forth, as well as an exploration of the preferred means and style of pursuing goals (see also O. Holsti 1977; Johnson 1977; Walker 1977). It should be noted that George's influence on the field is by no means confined to his work on operational codes; he has offered useful suggestions on methodological issues (see George on process tracing (George 1979), on the demerits of abstract theorizing versus **actor-specific theory** (George and Smoke 1974; George 1993), and on the need to bridge the gap between theory and practice in foreign policy (George 1993, 1994).

The work of Margaret G. Hermann is likewise an attempt to typologize leaders with specific reference to foreign policy dispositions. A psychologist by training, she was also involved in a CFP project (CREON). However, the core of her research is leaders' personal characteristics (Hermann 1970, 1978). Using a modified operational code framework in conjunction with content analysis, she is able to compare and contrast leaders' beliefs, motivations, decisional styles, and interpersonal styles. Furthermore, Hermann integrates this information into a more holistic picture of the leader, who may belong to one of six distinct 'foreign policy orientations'. Orientation allows her to make more specific projections about a leader's behaviour in a variety of circumstances. In the second wave of research, scholars began to explicitly compare and contrast the findings of different personality assessment schemes (Winter *et al.* 1991; Singer and Hudson 1992; Snare 1992; see also Winter 1973; Post 1990).

The role of perceptions and images in foreign policy was a very important research agenda in this first generation of FPA. The work of both Robert Jervis and Richard Cottam deserves special mention here. Jervis's *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976) and Cottam's *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* (1977) both explicate the potentially grave consequences of misperception in foreign policy situations by exploring its roots. Deterrence strategies can fail catastrophically if misperception of the other's intentions or motivations occur (see also the stimulus-response models of Holsti *et al.* (1968)). Like Janis, Halperin, and others, the work of Jervis and Cottam is consciously prescriptive: both include advice and suggestions for policy makers. Work in the late 1980s continuing this tradition included scholarship by Janice Gross Stein, Richard Ned Lebow, Ole Holsti, Alexander George, Deborah Welch Larson, Betty Glad, and Stephen Walt (as well as Jervis *et al.* 1985; Larson 1985, 1993; M. Cottam 1986; Glad 1989; George and Smoke 1989; O. Holsti 1989; Lebow and Stein 1990; Walt 1992). An excellent example of work in this period is that of Richard Herrmann (1985, 1986, 1993), who developed a typology of stereotypical images with reference to Soviet perceptions (the other as 'child', as 'degenerate', etc.) and began to extend his analysis to the images held by other nations, including American and Islamic images.

The work on cognitive constraints was informed by the work of scholars in other fields, including that of Herbert Simon (1985) on bounded rationality, Heuer (1999, but written between 1978 and 1986) on cognitive bias, and Kahneman *et al.* (1982) on heuristic error. Many other important cognitive and psychological studies which appeared during the 1970s and early 1980s dealt with a diversity of factors: motivations of leaders (Barber 1972; Winter 1973; Etheredge 1978), cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas (Shapiro and Bonham 1973; Axelrod 1976; Carbonell 1978), cognitive style (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1977); life experience of leaders (Stewart 1977), and others. Good edited collections of the time include Hermann (1977) and Falkowski (1979).

National and societal characteristics

Kal Holsti's (1970) elucidation of **national role conception** spans both the psychological and the social milieu. With this concept, Holsti seeks to capture how a nation views itself and its role in the international arena. Operationally, Holsti turns to elite perceptions of national role, arguing that these perceptions are arguably more salient to foreign policy choice. Perception of national role is also influenced by societal character, a product of the nation's socialization process. Differences here can lead to differences in national behaviour as well (e.g. Broderston 1961; Hess 1963; Merelman 1969; Renshon 1977; Bobrow *et al.* 1979). The methodology of national role conception was continued in the 1980s by Walker (1987) and others (Wish 1980; Cottam and Shih 1992; Shih 1993).

The study of culture as an independent variable affecting foreign policy was just beginning to be redeveloped near the end of the 1980s after petering out in the 1960s (Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965). Culture might have an effect on cognition (Motokawa 1989); it might have ramifications for structuration of institutions such as bureaucracies (Sampson 1987). Conflict resolution techniques might be different for different cultures as well (Cushman and King 1985; Pye 1986; Gaenslen 1989). Indeed, the very processes of policy making might be stamped by one's cultural heritage and socialization (Holland 1984; Etheredge 1985; Lampton 1986; Merelman 1986; Leung 1987; Banerjee 1991; Voss and Dorsey 1992).

The study of the role of societal groups in foreign policy making can be seen as an outgrowth of the more advanced study of societal groups in American domestic politics. Sometimes an individual scholar used theory developed for the American case to explore the more diverse universe of the international system. For example, Robert Dahl's volume, *Regimes and Oppositions* (1973), provided the key theoretical concepts necessary to analyse the relationship between domestic political pressure by societal groups and foreign policy choice by the government. Other more country- and region-specific case studies were also developed: see Deutsch *et al.* (1967), Hellman (1969), Dallin (1969), Chittick (1970), Hughes (1978), and Ogata (1977), among others. In the late 1980s, a **new wave** of thinking began to explore the limits of state autonomy in relation to other societal groups in the course of policy making. The work of Putnam (1988) on the **two-level game** of foreign and domestic policy was paradigmatic for establishing the major questions of this research subfield. Other excellent work includes Evans *et al.* (1985), Hagan (1987), Levy (1988), Lamborn and Mumme (1989), Levy and Vakili (1989), and Mastanduno *et al.* (1989). A **second wave** of research in this area can be seen in the work of Kaarbo (1993), Skidmore and Hudson (1993), and Van

Belle (1993) (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) for an interesting combination of game theory and FPA to understand domestic political imperatives and their effect on foreign policy).

The second-wave work of Joe Hagan deserves special note. He has compiled an extensive database on the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special reference to executive/legislative structures (Hagan 1993). The set includes 94 regimes for 38 nations over a 10-year period. His purpose is to explore the effects of political opposition on foreign policy choice. Using aggregate statistical analysis, Hagan is able to show, for example, that the internal fragmentation of a regime has substantially less effect on foreign policy behaviour than military or party opposition to the regime.

Domestic political imperatives could also be ascertained by probing elite and mass opinion (again, piggy-backing onto the sophisticated voter-attitude studies of American politics). Though usually confined to studies of democratic nations (especially America, where survey research results were abundant), these analyses were used to investigate the limits of the so-called Almond-Lippman consensus—that is, that public opinion is incoherent and lacking unity on foreign policy issues, and thus that public opinion does not have a large impact on the nation's conduct of foreign policy (see Bailey 1948; Almond 1950; Lippman 1955; Campbell *et al.* 1964; Converse 1964; Lipset 1966). Opinion data collected during the Vietnam War period appears to have served as a catalyst to re-examine this question. Caspary (1970) and Achen (1975) found more stability in American public opinion concerning foreign policy and international involvement than their predecessors. Mueller (1973) used the Vietnam War to show that although the public may change their opinions on international issues, they do so for rational reasons. Holsti and Rosenau (1979) and Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979) used survey data to identify recognizable ideological positions to which the public subscribes on foreign policy issues. A large amount of research was undertaken to show that public and elite opinion does affect governmental foreign policy decision making (see Cantril 1967; Verba *et al.* 1967; Graber 1968; Verba and Brody 1970; Hughes 1978; Yankelovich 1979; Beal and Hinckley 1984).

The study of the effect of national attributes (size, wealth, political accountability, economic system, etc.) on foreign policy was certainly, in a theoretical sense, in the Sprout genotype, but was carried out by scholars and with methods more to be placed in the Rosenau genotype (if you exclude pre-Rosenau writers such as Lenin). The propensity to be involved in war was usually the foreign policy dependent variable of choice in this work (see Rummel 1972, 1977, 1979; Kean and McGowan 1973; East and Hermann 1974; East 1978; Salmore and Salmore 1978; for a more holistic treatment, see Korany 1986).

The questions raised by these theorists are fascinating. Are large nations more likely to go to war than small nations? Are rich nations more likely to go to war than poor ones? Are authoritarian regimes more bellicose than democracies? Statistical manipulation of aggregate data, at best a blunt instrument, was unable to uncover any lawlike generalizations on this score (though for an interesting and hard-to-classify treatment of the multilevel causes and effects of war, see Beer (1981)). Political economy research on the effects of economic structures and conditions on foreign policy choice are fairly rare: the 'culture' of IPE and the 'culture' of FPA did not mix well, for reasons explored below. However, the works of Neil Richardson and Charles Kegley (e.g. Richardson and Kegley 1980) and Peter Katzenstein (e.g. Katzenstein 1985) are notable as exceptions to this generalization.

However, in the second-wave years, one notable exception to all the analysis of the previous years burst forth upon the scene—democratic peace theory. Democracies, it was noted, tend not to fight one another, though they fight non-democratic countries as often as other non-democracies do. This appeared to be an example of how a difference in polity type produced a difference in foreign policy behaviour (Russett 1993a,b). This has been a particularly interesting bridging question for FPA and IR (and is examined further in Chapter Three). Why do democracies not fight one another? Here we find more abstract theorists of war (Merritt and Zinnes 1991; Morgan 1992; Bremer 1993; Dixon 1993; Ray 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993) wrestling with a question that leads them into FPA waters and into conversation with FPA scholars (Hagan 1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995).

Finally, if it is possible to see the international system as part of the psycho-social milieu in which foreign policy decision making takes place, then the work of much of mainstream IR at this time can be seen as contributing to the Foreign Policy Analysis research agenda. The effects of system type, as elucidated by Kaplan (1957, 1972), may depend on the number of poles in the system, the distribution of power among poles, and the rules of the system game that permit its maintenance. This structure may then determine to a large extent the range of permissible foreign policy behaviour of nations. The work of Waltz was extremely influential in its description of the effects of an anarchical world system on the behaviour of its member states (see also Hoffmann 1961; Rosecrance 1963; Singer *et al.* 1972). FPA seemed not to emphasize this type of explanation, primarily because the variation in behaviour during the time when a certain system is maintained cannot be explained by reference to system structure because the structure has not changed. Explanation of that variation must be found at lower levels of analysis, where variation in the explanations can be identified. Here, then, is one of several sources for the notable lack of integration between actor-general systems theory in IR and FPA.

FPA self-reflection in the late 1970s and 1980s

A period of critical self-reflection in FPA began in the late 1970s and continued until the mid-1980s. The effects were felt unevenly across FPA, with CFP being affected the most; it is here that we see the most pruning, both theoretical and methodological, which will be discussed later. In decision-making studies there was a period of rather slow growth because of methodological considerations. The information requirements for conducting a high-quality group or bureaucratic analysis of a foreign policy choice are tremendous. If one were not part of the group or bureaucracy in question, detailed accounts of what transpired, preferably from a variety of primary source viewpoints, would be necessary. Because of security considerations in foreign policy, such information is not usually available for many years (e.g. until declassified). The question facing decision-making scholars became: Is it possible to be theoretically and policy relevant if one is relegated to doing case studies of events twenty years or more old? If so, how? If not, how is it possible to manoeuvre around the high data requirements to say something meaningful about more recent events? (See P. Anderson 1987.) Scholars wrestling with this issue came up with two basic responses: (a) patterns in group/bureaucratic processes can be isolated through historical case studies, on the basis of which both general predictions of and general recommendations for present-day foreign policy

decision making can be made; (b) innovative at-a-distance indicators of closed group/bureaucracy process can be developed, which allow for more specific explanation/prediction of resultant foreign policy choice.

FPA work at the psychological level actually expanded during this time period, but work at the societal level arguably contracted on some research fronts. The reason for this bifurcation in the genotype was methodological: psychology provided ready-made and effective tools for the study of political psychology, but political science did not offer the foreign policy analyst the same advantage. To understand how the broader socio-cultural-political context within a nation-state contributes to its governmental policy making (whether domestic or foreign) is, perforce, the domain of comparative politics. It is hopefully not controversial to aver that the theories and methods of comparative politics in this period were not quite as highly developed as those of psychology. The attempt to graft 'scientific' statistical analyses of variance onto the underdeveloped theory of comparative politics of the 1970s and 1980s was a failure. More successful were efforts to spin existing comparative politics work on a particular nation to the cause of explaining factors that contribute to that nation's foreign policy—for example, borrowing techniques from American politics (such as public opinion surveys) to study domestic political imperatives in the USA on foreign policy issues. Still missing were the conceptual and methodological tools necessary to push past the artificial barrier between comparative politics and international relations that stymied theory development. One of the greatest leaps forward in the present period of FPA is the innovative work begun on conceptualizing the 'two-level game' (Putnam 1988).

As mentioned, CFP dwindled in the 1980s. Indeed, the very term 'comparative foreign policy' began to sound quaint and naive. Membership of the Comparative Foreign Policy Section of the International Studies Association plummeted. Public vivisections took place, while Rosenau-genotype-style scholarship became scarce. Both sympathetic and unsympathetic criticism abounded (e.g. Ashley 1976, 1987; Munton 1976; East 1978; Kegley 1980; Caporaso *et al.* 1987; Hermann and Peacock 1987; Smith 1987). At one point, in exasperation, Kegley (1980: 12), himself a CFPer, chides, 'CFP risks being labelled a cult of methodological flagellomaniacs'.

This searing criticism and self-criticism revealed a number of inconsistencies in the CFP approach, which needed to be sorted out before any progress could be contemplated. The stumbling blocks included the following:

1. ***You can't have your parsimony and eat it, too.*** The tension between the desire of some CFPers for a hard-science-like grand unified theory and the assumption that micro-level detail is necessary if one really wants to explain and predict foreign policy behaviour became unbearable. Rosenau's 'Pre-theories' article (Rosenau 1966), when reviewed from this vantage point, sets the genotype up for an inevitable dilemma about parsimony. To what should we aspire: richly detailed, comprehensively researched micro-analyses of a few cases, or conceptually abstract, parsimonious statistico-mathematical renderings of thousands of events? One can see the problem in desiring richly detailed, comprehensively researched micro-analyses of thousands of events: a lifetime would be over before a theorist had collected enough data to do the first big 'run'! But many CFPers rejected the case study approach as unscientific and too much like the soft anecdotal research of the 'traditionalists' (Kegley 1980).

CFPers wanted to be behaviouralists and to be scientific, and a hallmark of this was aggregate empirical testing of cross-nationally applicable generalizations across large values of N . At the same time, they were fiercely committed to unpacking the black box of decision making, so the detail of their explanans grew, and with it their rejection of knee-jerk idealization of parsimony. Push had to come to shove at some point: CFP methods demanded parsimony in theory; CFP theory demanded nuance and detail in method.

2. **To quantify or not to quantify?** A corollary of large- N -size testing is the need for more precise measurement of data; indeed, quantification of variables is essential to linear regression and correlation techniques, as well as to mathematical manipulations such as differential equations. However, the independent variables of CFP included such non-quantifiables as perception, memory, emotion, culture, history, etc., all placed in a dynamic and evolving stream of human action and reaction that might not be adequately captured by arithmetic-based relationships. To leave such non-quantifiable explanatory variables out seems to defeat the very purpose of micro-analysis; to leave them in by forcing the data into quasi-interval level pigeonholes seems to do violence to the substance that CFP sought to capture. CFPers began to ask whether their methods were aiding them in achieving their theoretical goals or preventing them from ever achieving those goals.
3. **A final inconsistency centred in policy relevance.** As mentioned earlier, CFP had received a large amount of money from the government to create events data sets. CFP researchers successfully argued that such an investment would yield information of use to foreign policy makers. Specifically, events data would be used to set up early warning systems that would alert policy makers to crises in the making around the world (as if they do not also read the same sources from which events data come!).

Computerized decision aids and analysis packages with telltale acronyms began to appear—EWAMS (Early Warning and Monitoring System); CASCON (Computer-Aided Systems for Handling Information on Local Conflicts); CACIS (Computer-Aided Conflict Information System); XAIDS (Crisis Management Executive Decision Aids) (see Andriole and Hopple 1981). Unfortunately, these could never live up to their promise: the collected events could be had from other sources and so were nothing without the theory to explain and predict their occurrence. The methodological paradoxes explicated above resulted in theory that was stuck, by and large, at the level of globally applicable but specifically vacuous bivariate generalizations such as that 'large nations participate more in international interactions than small nations' (see McGowan and Shapiro 1973). Again, CFP found itself pulled in two opposed directions: Was the research goal to say something predictive about a specific nation at a specific time in a specific set of circumstances (which would be highly policy relevant, but which might closely resemble the output of a traditional country expert)? Or was the goal a grand unified theory (which would not be very policy relevant, but which would qualify you as a scientist and a generalist)? Attempts to accomplish both with the same research led to products that were unsatisfactory in a scholarly as well as a policy sense.

Hindsight is always 20/20; it does seem clear in retrospect that change was necessary. Left behind were (1) the aim of a grand unified theory, and (2) the methodological straitjacket imposed by the requirement of aggregate empirical testing. In 1980, Kegley spoke of the need

to come down from the rarified air of grand theory to middle-range theory, and to capture more of the particular:

To succeed partially is not to fail completely. . . . Goals (should be) downgraded to better fit capacities. . . . This prescribes reduction in the level of generality sought, so that more contextually-qualified, circumstantially bounded, and temporally/spatially-specified propositions are tested. More of the peculiar, unique, and particular can be captured at a reduced level of abstraction and generality. (Kegley 1980: 12, 19)

To be fair, this was arguably Rosenau's original aim, and the CFP community had to reach a consensus to return to its founding vision. The conference on New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, held at Ohio State University in May 1985, probably represents a finalization of these changes for the CFP group (see the resulting volume, Hermann *et al.* 1987; see also Gerner 1992).

Conclusion: contemporary FPA's research agenda

As FPA was being liberated from its inconsistencies in the late 1980s, the world was being liberated from the chess match of the Cold War. This was a felicitous coincidence for FPA, and was an added source of vigour for its research agenda. The significance of this temporal coincidence can be understood by remembering what types of IR theory were in ascendance at the time: neorealist systems structure theory and rational choice modelling. Indeed, the dominance was so overwhelming that on taking an IR theory course during this time, one would think these two were the *summum bonum* of all thinking in international relations (at least in the USA). This state of affairs was natural for American thinkers: America was one of two poles of power in the Cold War international system. A bipolar quasi-zero-sum rivalry lends itself relatively well to abstract actor-general analysis focused primarily on the macro-constraints imposed by the system. Furthermore, **actor-general theory** was more practical for scholars during the Cold War, because so little was known of the black box of the closed Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern Bloc foreign policy decision making bodies.

However, when the bipolar system collapsed with the fall of the Soviet bloc regimes, an important theoretical discovery was made: *it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone*. Along the same lines, in a period of great uncertainty and flux, lack of empirically grounded inputs to rational choice equations is deadly in terms of the usefulness of such analysis. Our intuitive understanding of the collapse involves variables more to be found in FPA: the personalities of Gorbachev, Havel, and Walesa; the activities of transnational groups such as the Lutheran Church and the Green Movement; the struggles between various domestic political players, such as the military, the Communist Party, the bureaucrats, etc.; the role of economics and societal needs in sparking the desire for change, etc. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the need for an 'actor-specific' complement to mainstream IR theory became stark in its clarity.

FPA in the post Cold War era retains the distinctive theoretical commitments that demarcated at its inception. Included among these are:

- a commitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information;

- a commitment to build middle-range theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world;
- a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;
- a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science;
- a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision making as important as the output thereof.

Nevertheless, FPA has evolved in the sophistication of the questions asked, and in the means of answering those questions. Indeed, FPA's ability to ask new questions is perhaps more promising in relation to its future theoretical potential than any other indicator. Einstein and Infeld (1938) commented that, '(t)he formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution which may be merely a matter of $\frac{1}{4}$ skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and works real advance in science'.

In order to see this advance, let us examine some of the new questions that have evolved from the old. As a detailed overview of FPA scholarship from 1993 to the present can be found in Hudson (2005, 2007), let us now turn to the micro-levels of analysis and then move toward macro-levels.

New questions

When studying the effects of **individual leaders** on foreign policy decision making, the key question is whether we can extend our understanding of how a leader's personality affects foreign policy through determining its effect on choice of advisors, preference for issues, preference for certain group processes, and so forth? Moreover, can we integrate different analytical schemes for analysing leader personality and its effects? What are the ramifications of new breakthroughs in **neuroscience** for FPA? How do various leader personality types shape the structure and process of groups serving them?

At the **group level**, we must then ask how problems are actually recognized by the group? How are situations 'framed' and 'represented'? How are options developed? How does a group come to share an interpretation of the situation? How does a group change an established interpretation? How does a group learn? How is the group's potential for creativity enhanced or dampened? How does group memory affect group action? How do groups become players in the 'two-level game'? How are group structure and process a function of societal culture?

At the level of **society and political competition**, we explore whether we can uncover the societal sources of change in shared perceptions? For example, how do attitudes of leaders and publics change as context changes? Can national role conception be re-configured to serve as the theoretical interface between a society and the individual members of that society who come to lead it and make its foreign policy decisions? Can we specify the effect on foreign policy of domestic political competition? Can we complete the theoretical circle and specify the effects on domestic politics of the implementation of a certain foreign policy choice? How can we discern culture's influence on foreign policy? Does type of political system impact on foreign policy? What is the effect of systemic change on foreign policy?

Methodologically speaking, there are just as many key questions to be considered. These include: Can events data be re-conceptualized to be of use to contemporary FPA? Can FPA utilize methods created to simulate human decision making as a means of integrating complex non-quantifiable data? Can we think of non-arithmetic ways to relate variables? Can rational choice models be altered to accommodate actor-specific idiosyncracies with regard to utility, choice mechanisms, and choice constraints? Can we create models that will allow us to use as inputs the actor-specific knowledge generated by country/region experts? When is the detail of actor-specifics necessary, and when is actor-general theory sufficient to explain and project FPDM? How could one instantiate a model of the 'two-level game'? Can discursive analysis or interpretivism be used to introduce the dynamics of evolving understanding in FPDM?

An Atlantic divide?

While there are new efforts to both catalogue and promote the analytical study of foreign policy in the Global South (Brummer 2011; Giacalone 2011; Zhang 2011), at this point such study is predominantly of Atlantic origins. This raises the question of whether there are important differences in the way such studies are conducted in the USA compared with European countries, to which an affirmative answer can be given. In a recent overview of such differences (Hadfield and Hudson 2011), the authors point out several distinctions between FPA (American) and what they term AFP (the analysis of foreign policy, European). This issue is of interest to the readers of this volume, for about half of its authors are American and about half are European.

Hadfield and Hudson note a greater emphasis on cognitively oriented theories in FPA than in AFP, as well as the more frequent use of quantitative methods by Americans and historical process-tracing by Europeans. They also note a clear preference for the use of American cases by American scholars, which, while not unexpected and also understandable, also bears predictable consequences for theory-building. For example, Zhang (2011) finds that in the Chinese case, being 'ideological' and being 'practical' are not oxymoronic terms, whereas in American-inspired theory, such personality orientations are seen as precluding one another. Hadfield and Hudson also note a greater sense of community among American FPA scholars, which they attribute to the small number of graduate programmes training FPA scholars in that country; they are all likely to know one another within one or two degrees of separation. Turning to the European context, there are almost no graduate programmes that emphasize FPA/AFP, and so as yet scholars have not been able to create a critical social mass that is the prerequisite for an epistemic community. Finally, Hadfield and Hudson suggest that AFP is far more theoretically inclusive than FPA has been to date, embracing not only actor-specific theories, but also grand theory and constructivist approaches. For example, one is not likely to see a reference to the work of Roy Bhaskar in American FPA literature, while such a reference might be very likely in AFP work.

New attempts to bridge IR and FPA

Also fairly recent in origin are sustained organized attempts to bridge the divide between FPA and IR. The two that we will mention in this section are neoclassical realism (exemplified by Lobell *et al.* 2009) and behavioural IR (exemplified by Walker *et al.* 2011; see also Mintz 2007).

Neoclassical realism attempts to cross the divide from the IR side to the FPA side, while behavioural IR is moving in the opposite direction.

Neoclassical realism is premised on the understanding that 'unit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states—great powers as well as lesser states—to respond to systemic imperatives' (Lobell *et al.* 2009: 4). While the power distribution within a system may bound grand strategy, the implementation of this strategy through decisions by foreign policy executives concerning threat assessment, risk, and mobilization of domestic resources, including public support, simply cannot be inferred from the 'grand' level. Historical process-tracing is the preferred methodology of this school.

Behavioral IR, on the other hand, takes as its touchstone the field of 'behavioural economics', associated with the work of such scholars as Richard Thaler. Walker and his co-authors define the approach as 'a social-psychological analysis of world politics, which employs a general systems theory [i.e. role theory—ed.] to unify the understanding of actors, actions, and relations that constitute foreign policy and international relations' (Walker *et al.* 2011: 5). In other words, behavioural IR seeks to integrate the external world of events with the internal world of beliefs by examining strategic moves within dyads. The operational codes of the two actors are deciphered by quantitative content analysis of leader texts, and then a theory of strategic game moves (TOM) is employed to determine (at an abstract level) the next move that each actor in the dyad will take and how their game will resolve over sequential moves. The use of a game-theoretic logic informed by unit-level characteristics is an interesting amalgam of actor-general and actor-specific theorizing which, like neoclassical realism, attempts to bridge the divide between FPA and IR. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that neoclassical realism and behavioural IR—research programmes with the very same bridging goal—are working in such divergent methodological traditions that one wonders if they could possibly communicate with one another. But that is a topic for the future.

These are all exciting new questions, issues, and approaches to be exploring. Doubtless some of you will be involved in this work. It is a wonderful time to become engaged in FPA—a time of new horizons.



Key points

- Foreign policy analysis takes as its theoretical ground the human decision makers, acting singly and in groups, who make foreign policy.
- Three paradigmatic works laid the foundation of FPA—Richard Snyder and colleagues on decision making, James Rosenau on comparative foreign policy, and Harold and Margaret Sprout on the psycho-social milieu of foreign policy decision making.
- Several emphases, corresponding to levels of analysis in FPA, began to emerge from this foundation, including work on small/large groups, events data, political psychology of leaders, cultural effects on foreign policy, the effects of domestic political contestation on FPD, and the influence of national attributes and systemic characteristics on FPB.
- FPA retains its emphases on actor-specific theory, multicausal explanations, interdisciplinarity, and the explanations of foreign policy processes, as well as foreign policy outcomes.
- Current FPA scholarship explores linkages between the levels of FPA analysis, and combines that with a search for new methodologies that are more appropriate for actor-specific theoretical investigation.

**Questions**

1. What are the key hallmarks of FPA?
2. What is the difference between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour?
3. What are the primary levels of analysis examined in FPA?
4. What did Richard Snyder and his colleagues contribute to FPA's foundations?
5. What did James Rosenau contribute to FPA's foundations?
6. What did Harold and Margaret Sprout contribute to FPA's foundations?
7. What is events data and how is it used in FPA?
8. What is comparative foreign policy (CFP)?
9. Why did FPA enter a period of self-reflection in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and what was the result?
10. What kinds of questions are being asked in FPA research today? How effective and/or necessary are 'bridging techniques' between IR and FPA?

**Further reading**

Caporaso, J.A., Hermann, C.F., and Kegley, C.W. (1987), 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: Perspectives on the Future', *International Studies Notes*, 13: 32–46.

This is an interesting piece, from a historical point of view, as it attempts to engage international political economy (IPE) with FPA.

Garrison, J. (ed.) (2003), 'Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20', *International Studies Review*, 5: 156–163.

This special issue of *ISR* features a variety of FPA scholars discussing the future prospects of FPA as a field of study.

Gerner, D.J. (1992), 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas', *International Studies Notes*, 18(4).

Gerner's piece is an excellent summary of FPA scholarship up until the end of the Cold War.

Hudson, V.M. (2007), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield).

This textbook not only covers the history of FPA, but also seven levels of analysis, as well as a discussion of integrative efforts in the field.

Neack, L., Hey J.A., and Haney, P.J. (1995), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).

This edited volume served as a textbook in many FPA classes from 1995 to 2005, and includes chapters on nearly all levels of analysis, as well as subjects such as events data.



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